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Abstract 
 
In addition to containing stable information to explain inflation, state-local expenditures have also a 
larger share of the forecast error variance of US inflation than the Federal funds rate. Non-defense 
federal expenditures are useful in predicting real output variations and, starting from the early 
1980s, present also a larger share of the forecast error variance of US real output than the Federal 
funds rate.  
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1. Introduction  
While US output variations can be explained somewhat reliably with the use of a set of relevant 
variables such as Federal funds rate (FFR) and certain monetary aggregates next to past variations 
in real output itself, empirical work confronts significant difficulties in assigning informative 
variables to explain US inflation. Even the FFR fails to provide statistically significant information 
content.1 Aksoy and Melina (in press) study a wide range of fiscal indicators and find that certain 
fiscal variables contain statistically significant information for U.S. inflation and real output growth 
beyond the information contained in the FFR and autoregressive components of inflation and 
output. 
Here, we focus on five expenditure aggregates, and (i) investigate their informational role for 
US inflation and real output both over a long post-WWII sample and a recent sub-sample, as it is 
widely accepted that change in the conduct of US monetary policy in the early 1980s have affected 
the transmission of shocks in the economy; and (ii) compute the share of the expenditure aggregates 
in explaining the forecast error variance (FEV) of US inflation and output growth.  
 
2.   Data 
The quarterly seasonally adjusted data cover the period 1959:1-2008:2. We extract the 
following US macroeconomic variables from the database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis: (i) 
real output (GDP in chained 2000 US dollars); (ii) price level (GDP deflator); (iii) a set of 
expenditure indicators that excludes transfer payments (BEA Table 3.9.6): (a) government 
consumption expenditures and gross investment, (b) total federal expenditures, (c) federal non-
defense expenditures, (d) defense expenditures, (e) state-local expenditures. We then use the FFR 
provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
 
 
                                                          
1 See for example Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Stock and Watson (2003). 
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3. G ranger non-causality tests 
Our econometric specifications follow Friedman and Kuttner (1992). Instead of using an 
arbitrary number of lags, we rely on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to select the lag 
structure every time we include a different expenditure indicator.2  
The specification for real output changes is given by: 
 
(1) 
where all variables represent annualized log differences, except for the change in the interest rate, 
which is simply the annualized first difference. The terms  represent output 
growth, inflation, the change in the short-term interest rate, the change in an alternative expenditure 
indicator and an error term respectively. The inflation equation is:  
 
(2) 
In Table 1, we report the lag structure for both equations.3  
< Table 1 > 
We run the above regressions over the full sample and over a restricted sample starting in 
1983:1, as it is widely accepted that change in the conduct of US monetary policy in the 1980s may 
have affected the transmission of shocks in the economy. Then, we test for Granger non-causality of 
the expenditure indicators by imposing the null hypothesis that all the lags of each alternative 
indicator are jointly insignificant, i.e.   
< Table 2 > 
In Table 2 we show that in the output equation, non-defense federal expenditures have 
significant information content both in the full and the recent sample. Moreover, while government 
expenditures have significant information content over the recent sample, defense expenditures only 
                                                          
2 We run each regression with every combination of lags, from 1 to 12 for each regressor. Then we choose the 
combination that minimizes AIC. 
3 The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and the White test reject the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. The Breusch-
Godfrey Lagrange-multiplier test fails to reject the null of uncorrelated errors. Therefore, we run all tests based on 
Wald-type chi-square statistics using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 4
in the full sample. In the inflation equation, state-local expenditures have significant information 
content in both samples;4 defense expenditures only in the full sample.5 Consistent with previous 
studies while over the full sample the FFR has a significant predictive role on real output growth 
and inflation, over the more recent sample the FFR is not useful in explaining inflation.  
 
4. Stability tests 
Recursive p-values. We obtain recursive p-values in three different ways: (i) by fixing the 
endpoint (END) of the sample: the first p-value refers to sample 1980:2-2008:2, the last refers to 
1962:1-2008:2; (ii) by fixing the starting point (STR): from sample 1962:1-1983:4 to 1962:1-
2008:2; (iii) by rolling the sample: from 1962:1-1983:4 to 1983:3-2008:2. In Figure 1 we plot the 
recursive p-values of the Wald tests. The straight horizontal line represents the 10 percent 
significance level.  
< F igure 1 > 
Figure 1.A shows that changes in government expenditures have Granger caused changes in real 
output in more recent times. Changes in defense expenditures, while significant in the initial 
samples, have not been significant in many more recent ones. On the contrary, non-defense federal 
expenditures have been significant till the sample end.  
Figure 1.B captures the stable information content of state-local expenditures for inflation. 
While changes in defense expenditures have not been significant in more recent times, non-defense 
federal expenditures have progressively gained significance.  
Formal stability tests. We run stability tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in 
the constant term and the autoregressive coefficients of the expenditure variables using the Quandt 
                                                          
4 In analyzing potential reverse causation, in both samples, we find that while output growth Granger causes state-local 
expenditures at a 10 percent significance level, inflation does not Granger cause state-local expenditures at any 
conventional significance level. 
5 See Poterba and Rueben (1999), Sørensen et al. (2001) and Aksoy and Melina (in press) for a discussion on state-local 
finances.   
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likelihood ratio statistic in Wald form (sup-Wald); the exponential average Wald statistic (exp-
Wald); and the average Wald statistic (mean-Wald).6  
< Table 3 > 
Table 3 shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy in all cases. 
 
5. Forecast er ror variance decompositions 
Another criterion we use to assess the information value of the examined expenditure indicators 
is their ability to account for the FEV of real output growth and inflation over a ten-quarter horizon. 
We estimate unconstrained vector-autoregressive (VAR) representations for real output growth and 
inflation in which we include the alternative expenditure indicators one at a time.7   
    Figure 2 displays the shares of the FEV attributed to the alternative expenditure indicators and to 
the FFR for real output growth and inflation respectively.  
< F igure 2> 
Figure 2.A shows that, in all cases, FFR outperforms the expenditure indicators in the FEV 
decomposition of real output growth. However, in the recent subsample, the non-defense portion of 
federal expenditures has a larger share of FEV than the FFR, and federal and defense expenditures 
display a large contribution towards explaining the FEV of real output over at least a six-quarter 
forecast horizon. Figure 2.B shows that, in the full sample, in most cases expenditure indicators 
outperform FFR in the inflation equation. State-local expenditures outperform FFR both in the full 
sample and the more recent one.  
Figure 3 allows us to compare the relative performance of the expenditure variables. 
< F igure 3> 
                                                          
6 To run the tests a 15-percent symmetric sample trimming is applied.  
7 Results are not significantly affected by variable orderings. Choleski ordering for output: output, inflation, FFR, 
expenditure indicator; for inflation: inflation, output, FFR, expenditure indicator. AIC selects 6, 7, 7, 5 and 6 lags when 
we include government, federal, defense, non-defense, and state-local expenditures, respectively. 
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Figure 3.A highlights the dominance of non-defense federal expenditures on all the other 
expenditure indicators in the FEV of output in the recent sub-sample. For the full sample, there is 
no conclusive evidence. Figure 3.B confirms the dominance of state-local expenditures over all the 
other expenditure indicators in the FEV of inflation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In addition to containing information to explain inflation, state-local expenditures have a larger 
share of the FEV of US inflation than the FFR. Non-defense federal expenditures are useful in 
predicting real output variations and, starting from early 1980s, have a larger share of the FEV of 
US real output than the FFR.  
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Table 1 
Lag selection in output growth and inflation equations 
(Akaike Information Criterion) 
 
  Output growth   Inflation  
Expenditure variable m n q r     n m q r 
Government 4 1 4 6   4 10 10 1 
           
Federal 4 3 6 6   4 10 10 1 
           
Defense 4 3 6 6   4 10 10 4 
           
Non-defense 2 3 6 1   4 10 10 1 
           
State-local 4 1 4 3     8 10 9 11 
   
m = output; n = inflation; q = interest rate; r = expenditure variable 
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Table 2 
Granger non-causality chi-square statistics 
p-values in parentheses 
 
Tests on the joint insignificance of lags of alternative expenditure variables 
  Output growth equation Inflation equation 
Expenditure variable 1959:2-2008:2 1983:1-2008:2 1959:2-2008:2 1983:1-2008:2 
Government 8.4855 11.8686 0.4496 0.2825 
 (0.2046) (0.0650) (0.5025) (0.5951) 
Federal 7.7149 6.0499 0.3380 1.0239 
 (0.2597) (0.4176) (0.5610) (0.3116) 
Defense 10.9989 8.2844 8.7752 6.1635 
 (0.0884) (0.2180) (0.0670) (0.1873) 
Non-defense 4.8522 4.4656 0.8226 1.4191 
 (0.0276) (0.0123) (0.3644) (0.2335) 
State-local 4.2110 4.1256 36.1422 21.9459 
  (0.2396) (0.4959) (0.0002) (0.0248) 
Tests on the joint insignificance of lags of FFR 
in the presence of alternative expenditure variables 
  Output growth equation Inflation equation 
Expenditure variable 1959:2-2008:2 1983:1-2008:2 1959:2-2008:2 1983:1-2008:2 
Government 29.6680 9.4077 21.5520 8.3249 
 (0.0000) (0.0517) (0.0176) (0.5971) 
Federal 41.5778 19.4234 23.4114 18.0540 
 (0.0000) (0.0035) (0.0093) (0.0541) 
Defense 40.5959 21.1657 24.9646 16.0990 
 (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0054) (0.0968) 
Non-defense 39.8776 25.6392 21.5278 8.6701 
 (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0177) (0.5637) 
State-local 32.8103 7.3617 25.3451 8.3923 
  (0.0000) (0.0612) (0.0026) (0.4951) 
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Table 3 
Tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints 
Null hypothesis: no structural breaks in the constant and in the expenditure variables 
Asymptotic p-values (Hansen, 1997) in parentheses 
 
Expenditure variable sup-Wald exp-Wald mean-Wald sup-Wald exp-Wald mean-Wald 
Government 3.3956 1.0550 1.9692 2.7994 0.6554 1.2388 
 (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9157) (0.7458) (0.6702) 
Federal 5.9370 1.1948 2.1435 3.3009 0.5673 1.0029 
 (0.9980) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.8430) (0.8104) (0.7797) 
Defense 4.0274 1.0528 1.9192 2.4341 0.8158 1.5393 
 (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9992) 
Non-defense 4.5750 1.4171 2.5946 3.3034 0.5696 0.9621 
 (0.6289) (0.3379) (0.2433) (0.8426) (0.8086) (0.7991) 
State-local 3.7739 0.6828 1.2093 2.7791 0.8460 1.5994 
 (0.9894) (0.9997) (0.9998) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) 
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F igure 2. Shares of expenditure indicators and FFR in the FEV 
A. Output growth  B. Inflation 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
GOV = government; FED = federal; DEF = defense; NON = non-defense; STL = state-local; INT = Federal funds rate 
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F igure 3. Shares of expenditure indicators in the FEV 
 
A. Output growth  B. Inflation 
  
  
GOV = government; FED = federal; DEF = defense; NON = non-defense; STL = state-local. 
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 State-local expenditures contain stable information to explain US inflation. 
 These also explain a larger share of the FEV of US inflation than FFR. 
 Non-defense federal expenditures help predict real output variations. 
 From the 1980s, these explain more of the FEV of US real output than the FFR. 
 
 
